Section 33: Penalties for contempt of court

Supreme Court decisions interpreting this section

1. Supreme Court Judgment No. 3147/2562 (2019)

   A clean record does not by itself call for a suspended sentence for contempt. Where the conduct is serious, suspension is inappropriate, though the court may still moderate the punishment for an offender who has never been imprisoned, is elderly and in poor health, and who has tried to mitigate the harm.

   The second accused had used land that was in fact a large pond as security for the provisional release of a defendant in another case, as he had in this one, and had breached bail bonds in several further cases in three different courts. The Supreme Court held that his conduct, being contempt under section 31(1), was serious and did not warrant suspension of the sentence. But because he had never been imprisoned, was elderly and in poor health, and had paid the fine to the trial court in full in mitigation, there was reason to punish him leniently.

2. Supreme Court Judgment No. 5958/2559 (2016)

   Contempt under section 31(1) with section 33 is committed by misconduct within the court precincts. A person who directs another to commit such misconduct but does not himself act within the precincts is therefore not a joint principal: his liability is that of an instigator, under section 31(1) and section 33 read with sections 17 and 84 of the Penal Code.

   A court director reported that a power of attorney filed in a credit-card case bore the name and signature of a lawyer whose membership card appeared to have been altered. The courts below found the first and third accused to have jointly committed contempt under sections 31(1) and 33 with section 83 of the Penal Code, sentencing each to four months imprisonment, halved to two months for the first accused on his confession. On final appeal the Supreme Court declined to disturb the findings of fact or to suspend the sentence, but corrected the basis of the third accused liability: all that was found against him was that he had directed the first accused to use the second accused name as counsel and to sign that name on the power of attorney, and it did not appear that he had done so within the court precincts, so he could not be a joint principal. His act was that of an instigator, and his conviction was varied to one under sections 31(1) and 33 with sections 17 and 84 of the Penal Code.

3. Supreme Court Judgment No. 3395/2566 (2023)

   The power to punish contempt under Sections 31(1) and 33 is a special power the court exercises without a prosecutor, and it is distinct from any ordinary crime arising from the same facts, so a later criminal prosecution is not barred as a repeat prosecution.

   The Court explained that contempt under Sections 31(1) and 33 gives the court a special power to punish without any complainant or prosecutor, distinct from the defendant's separate offence of forgery. Even though the contempt punishment was final, the later criminal prosecution on the same facts was not barred as a repeat prosecution.

Curated decisions with case numbers verified against the Supreme Court database. English renderings are the firm's editorial translation for study.