Section 448: Prescription period for tort claims

Supreme Court decisions interpreting this section

1. Supreme Court Judgment No. 11027/2558 (2015) ★ Landmark

   The one-year period in section 448 paragraph 1 runs from the day on which the injured person both knew of the wrongful act and knew who must pay compensation, taken together. An insurer suing as subrogee under section 880 stands in the insured shoes and has only the rights the insured had against the wrongdoer under section 226 paragraph 1, so the period runs from the insured knowledge and not the insurer own. Where the insurer proves only the date of the accident and does not prove that the insured was then unaware who was liable, the insured is taken to have known from the date of the accident.

   An insurer indemnified its insured, a highway police lieutenant colonel, for an accident on 24 May 2007 and then sued the Department of Highways as subrogee. It had earlier sued the Department of Rural Roads, believing that department maintained the road, and said it learned who was really liable only on 1 September 2008, when it received that department defence. The Supreme Court held that section 448 paragraph 1 runs from the day the injured person knew both of the wrongful act and of the person liable; but as subrogee under section 880 the insurer had only the rights the insured had against the wrongdoer under section 226 paragraph 1, so it was the insured knowledge that mattered. The insurer proved only the date of the accident and never proved that the insured was then unaware who was liable; as a highway police officer he would have known which department maintained that road, so he is taken to have known from 24 May 2007. The action having been filed on 30 October 2008, the claim was out of time and was dismissed.

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2. Supreme Court Judgment No. 1993/2562 (2019)

   Under section 448 paragraph 1 time runs from the day the injured person knows both of the wrongful act and of the person liable to pay. Receiving a copy of the court order that voided the election is not that day where the claimant has not yet held the fresh election or incurred any expense: no damage has yet been suffered and no tort has yet arisen. Nor does time run merely from the day the expense is incurred. It ran here from the day the municipality received the Election Commission letter fixing the sum recoverable, that being the day it knew both the tort and the person liable.

   A municipality claimed the cost of re-running a local council election that had been voided because the defendant breached section 43 paragraph 2(2) of the Local Election Act B.E. 2545. It received the appellate court order on 11 December 2013, held the fresh election on 26 January 2014, and received the Election Commission letter fixing the recoverable sum at 183,779.50 baht on 30 June 2015. The Supreme Court held that time did not run from 11 December 2013, when no election had been held and no expense incurred, so that no damage and no tort yet existed; it ran from 30 June 2015, when the municipality knew both the wrongful act and the person liable, and the action filed on 2 June 2016 was within the year. The Court added that this claim was not a duplicate of the separate action for the mayoral election costs, because the council members share could not be claimed under section 99 of that Act and was recoverable under section 420 instead; and, raising standing of its own motion as a public-order question, that a local authority inability to pay counsel out of its budget is an internal matter which does not deprive it of standing.

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3. Supreme Court Judgment No. 14700/2557 (2014)

   A State agency's claim for the full value of natural resources destroyed is a claim under section 97 of the Enhancement and Conservation of National Environmental Quality Act B.E. 2535, a specific statute, and not a claim for compensation in tort under section 420. Section 448 therefore does not apply at all, and with no special prescription fixed the general ten-year period under section 193/30 governs.

   The State sued for damage caused by encroachment on, clearing of and logging within a national park in Kalasin, covering 1,330 rai in all. Because the complaint claimed the full value of the natural resources destroyed under section 97 of the Enhancement and Conservation of National Environmental Quality Act B.E. 2535, a specific statute, and was not a claim in tort under section 420, the Court held that the one-year prescription in section 448 did not apply. No special prescription being fixed, the claim was governed by the ten-year period in section 193/30.

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Curated decisions with case numbers verified against the Supreme Court database. English renderings are the firm's editorial translation for study.