Renewing the Lease with Majority Estate-Administrators After the Old Lease Ends Does Not Breach the Prior Settlement การทำสัญญาเช่าฉบับใหม่กับผู้จัดการมรดกเสียงข้างมากหลังสัญญาเดิมหมด ไม่เป็นการผิดสัญญาประนีประนอม

SUPREME COURT DECISION No. 3001/2568
Year: 2025 (B.E. 2568)
Relevant Code Sections: Civil Procedure, Section(s) 57, 142, 246, 252, 274, 275, 276, 295

SUMMARY
A compromise judgment let the plaintiff lease two plots of estate land, just over 5 rai used as a market, for three years at 300,000 baht a month, ending 31 December 2564 (2021). When the term ran out the plaintiff did not move out and did not hand the land back, and on 15 February 2565 the defendant obtained a writ of execution to evict. What the plaintiff had done instead was sign a fresh three-year lease on 24 December 2564 with the two intervenors, who with the defendant were the three administrators of the deceased's estate and so formed the majority. The Supreme Court held that granting that lease, to produce income for the heirs, was ordinary estate administration under Civil and Commercial Code section 1719, so the continued occupation rested on the new lease rather than on the compromise. The plaintiff had therefore performed the compromise judgment and the defendant had no right to enforce it. The Court reversed, revoked the writ and the execution under Civil Procedure Code section 295, and struck the intervenors out of the cause list.

FACTS OF THE CASE
Bamrung died leaving an estate whose administration is not yet complete. Two of the estate's assets are title deeds 1083 and 1084, just over 5 rai of land used as a market. After several rounds of removal and appointment the estate had three administrators: the two intervenors and the defendant.

The plaintiff had sued claiming the defendant let him the land for a market from January 2559 (2016); the defendant denied ever letting it, and the Court of First Instance dismissed the claim. While that case was on appeal, on 5 December 2561 (2018) the heirs consented to the defendant letting the land to the plaintiff for three years and to settling on those terms. The parties signed a compromise agreement on 26 December 2561, and on 28 February 2563 (2020) the Court of Appeal entered judgment on it. The compromise let the plaintiff the two plots for a market for three years, 1 January 2562 to 31 December 2564, at 300,000 baht a month; on expiry or default the plaintiff was to remove his property and hand the land and buildings back within 30 days, failing which the defendant could execute at once.

On 24 December 2564 the two intervenors, as a majority of the three administrators, granted the plaintiff a fresh three-year lease of the same land running 1 January 2565 to 31 December 2567, so that the rent would produce income to distribute to the heirs. When the compromise term expired the plaintiff did not move out and did not hand the land back, and on 15 February 2565 the defendant obtained a writ of execution to evict him and an execution officer was appointed.

The plaintiff applied to suspend and cancel the execution and the Court of First Instance dismissed the application. The two intervenors applied to be joined at the execution stage under Civil Procedure Code section 57 paragraph one (1). The Court of Appeal reversed: it allowed the intervention itself and suspended execution until the majority of the administrators should wish to proceed. The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court with leave.

COURT'S HOLDING
Where a tenant remains in possession after a compromise-judgment lease expires, but does so under a fresh lease granted by the majority of the estate's administrators, the tenant has performed the compromise judgment. Possession is unbroken; what changes is its legal basis, and the tenant does not have to vacate and re-enter. Granting such a lease to produce income for the heirs is ordinary estate administration within the administrators' powers under Civil and Commercial Code section 1719. The landlord cannot then invoke the compromise judgment to execute under Civil Procedure Code sections 274 to 276, and a writ already issued is defective and must be revoked under section 295, a public-order question the Supreme Court may raise of its own motion under section 142(5) with sections 246 and 252. Separately, an intervention at the execution stage under section 57(1) must be filed with and decided by the court that issued the writ, so the Court of Appeal acted improperly in granting it in that court's place.

LEGAL ANALYSIS
The first question was whether execution should be suspended. The Supreme Court began with the administrators' powers. The two intervenors are administrators of the estate together with the defendant, and under Civil and Commercial Code section 1719 an administrator has the right and the duty to do what is necessary for the general administration of the estate or for distributing it to the heirs. When the two of them, being a majority of the three, let the land to the plaintiff on 24 December 2564 for a term beginning after the compromise lease had ended, and did so in order to produce income to divide among the heirs, that was an ordinary act of estate administration within their authority.

That determines the character of the plaintiff's continued occupation. He held the land for three years under the compromise judgment until it expired on 31 December 2564, and thereafter he held it under the new lease. His possession never rested on the expired compromise. He had therefore performed the judgment, and he cannot be treated as in breach of the compromise agreement. Because there was no breach, the defendant had no ground to invoke the compromise judgment to have an eviction writ issued under Civil Procedure Code sections 274, 275 and 276.

It follows that the order of 15 February 2565 appointing an execution officer was defective, and the Supreme Court may revoke both the writ and the execution under section 295. That question concerns public order, so under section 142(5) together with sections 246 and 252 the Court may decide it of its own motion even though no party raised it.

On the intervention, section 57 paragraph one (1) requires a person claiming a right connected with the enforcement of a judgment to file the application with the court that issued the writ. That court, here the Court of First Instance, had to hold the inquiry and rule on it. The Court of Appeal was therefore wrong to grant the intervention itself in that court's place. The Court nevertheless declined to remit the point: since the plaintiff had not breached the compromise and the defendant had no right to execute, a fresh ruling on the intervention would serve no purpose, and the two intervenors should bring a separate action instead.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
If you are a tenant on estate land and your right to be there is about to change, get the new basis in place before the old one ends and keep the documents. This tenant stayed put and won because a fresh lease signed on 24 December 2564 covered the period from 1 January 2565, so there was never a day when his occupation rested on the expired compromise. He did not have to move out and move back in.

For co-administrators of an estate, the majority can let estate property as part of general administration under Civil and Commercial Code section 1719, and a dissenting administrator cannot use an old judgment in his own favour to undo it. If you are the administrator who disagrees, the remedy is a challenge to the act of administration, not an execution writ.

Two procedural warnings. An application to intervene at the execution stage under Civil Procedure Code section 57 paragraph one (1) must be filed with the court that issued the writ, not with the appellate court; the Court of Appeal's decision to allow it itself was held improper, and the two intervenors were struck out and told to bring a separate action. And a writ issued where there was no breach is defective: it can be revoked under section 295, and because the point goes to public order the court can take it up without either side raising it.

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Note: This is an English-language summary of the Thai original judgment.
For the authoritative Thai text, please refer to the Thai version above
or visit deka.supremecourt.or.th.